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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the role of bank notes issued by the private Enskilda
banks in the expansion of the Swedish monetary stock under the classic
specie standard maintained during the period 1834-1913. The use of balance
sheets has made possible the estimation of more accurate and continuous
series of the Swedish money stock and bank reserves. The conclusion of the
paper is that the Enskilda banks contributed to Swedish economic expansion
and integration, through the provision both of credit and of generally
accepted means of payment, beyond what would have been possible for the
central bank, constrained as the latter was by specie convertibility
requirements. But, the Enskilda banks did not operate according to free
banking theory. The re-establishment of the silver standard guaranteed by
the central bank was crucial for this process, since it allowed the Enskilda
banks to hold central bank notes instead of specie as reserves. The notes
issued by the Enskilda banks were accepted as deposits in the banking
system but not as reserves. The fact that more Enskilda than Riksbank notes
circulated among the public was a result of the law of adverse monetary
selection: Gresham’s Law.
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Introduction
In 1834 Sweden re-established the silver standard it had abandoned in 1809. This action
marked the beginning of a fixed exchange rate regime that lasted for more than eighty
years until the outbreak of World War I. During this entire period, the maintenance of
the specie standard was the principal duty of the central bank. Despite being the poorest
European country operating under a convertible standard, Sweden in 1873 followed
Germany in converting from silver to gold. According to Eichengreen and Flandreau,
the adherence of a country to any convertible specie standard was more important for
economic growth than whether that standard was based on silver or on gold.
1 They
would thus argue that it was the specie standard as such that was of fundamental
importance for Swedish economic growth.
The nineteenth century witnessed great changes in the Swedish economy. Local,
national and international markets were integrated during this epoch. These changes
affected not only the money market, but also the very nature of the money in
circulation.
2 Sweden’s specie standard guaranteed international integration, but it
sometimes impeded the provision of credit and acceptable means of payment in larger
sections of the Country.
The extent of Swedish poverty during this period is well illustrated by the very
limited and stagnant circulation of metallic coins, as well as a supply of specie metal
insufficient to provide the Country with an adequate supply of generally accepted
money and credit. Instead, the Swedish economy relied heavily on personal credits,
IOUs and other types of informal money, accepted only on a personal or regional basis,
thus hindering more widespread economic integration. During this era of rapid
economic expansion, Sweden was able to preserve a specie standard while
simultaneously replacing the money substitutes originally in circulation with money
accepted throughout the Country.
In accord with the assumptions of free banking theory, previous studies of the private
note issuing banks (the Enskilda banks) as a system have visualized them as if they
were working in an economic vacuum. Incorporating the demands of the specie
standard, as well as the actual condition of the economy and the credit market, has
resulted in two new conclusions: 1) In some fundamental respects, the system of
                                                
1 Eichengreen, B. & Flandreau, M. (1994) pp. 2-3, 6-8, Figure 1 & 24
Enskilda banks did not fit the theoretical concept of a free banking system, and, more
important, 2) The Enskilda banks, in concert with the central bank (the Riksbank) and
its issuance of notes backed by specie, were essential to Swedish monetization.
As demonstrated in this chapter, the demand for generally accepted means of
payment was partly satisfied by a type of domestic specie exchange system that
loosened the money supply restrictions imposed by the international specie standard.
The key Swedish actors in this system were the Enskilda Banks and the Riksbank. The
Riksbank, being the sole issuer of legal tender, supplied high powered notes in response
to the international demand resulting from specie convertibility. The Enskilda banks
issued what can be described as ”medium powered notes” primarily backed by
Riksbank notes. As was essential during a period of national market integration, the
Enskilda bank notes came to be accepted nation wide. This domestic specie exchange
system permitted an expansion of the Swedish money supply of what can be considered
as currency beyond what might have been expected under an international specie
convertibility regime.
The supplying of Sweden with credit and generally accepted means of payment can
be simplified into a two step process: first, regional ”unofficial” money in circulation
was replaced by Enskilda bank notes and, second, these notes, together with circulating
Riksbank notes, provided a sufficient quantity of currency accepted nationwide to allow
the banking system, starting in the late 1860's, to balloon the money supply by the use
of deposits.
Quantitative information on the Enskilda banks was obtained from their end of year
balance sheets published during the period 1834-1906.
3 With only a few exceptions,
data was found for the entire period. It thus became possible to analyze developments
over time. The balance sheets are unique in that they include vital information
concerning the precise composition of reserves, as well as the extent to which the
Enskilda banks utilized their legal ability to issue notes.
4
                                                                                                                                          
2 For a discussion of the effects of ongoing economic and financial integration on the role, as well as the
form, of money (see Goodhart, C. (1995) pp. 2-5).
3 These were published in Post & Inrikes Tidning for the years 1834-1870 and Sammandrag af Bankernas
Uppgifter 1871-1906. For the years 1836 -1842 and 1867, the figures have been supplemented with data
from Brisman, S. (1924) pp. 246-247 and Sveriges Riksbank (1931) p. 177. The figures for 1866 refer to
September 30, rather than December 31, of that year (see Ögren, A (2003a) Chapter 1).
4 The accuracy and reliability of the figures reported by the Enskilda banks might be questioned, but
when differences were detected compared to other sources, the balance sheets reported less favorable
(lower) ratio of reserves to notes issued. See BaU 1853/54, Brisman, S. (1924) pp. 246-247,5
Bank Note Substitutes, Free Banking and Endogenous Money
By definition, the money supply consists of bank notes and coins in circulation. Bank
notes, in turn, are defined as non-interest bearing credit instruments transferable among
actors as payment. Note substitutes, however, are usually not defined as part of the
money supply.
A problem immediately encountered is that this definition of the money stock seems
to have little relevance to the Swedish nineteenth century experience. The most striking
feature of the Swedish money market of the day was the shortage of specie, coins and
other official means of payment.
5 Indeed, contemporary observers considered this
shortage to be a constraint on economic growth. Although their circulation was
negligible, coins were regarded as real money by the authorities and by scholars. Notes
were thought of as ”representing” coins.
6 Clearly, the lack of official forms of money
forced the practical Swedish concept of money to be quite elastic.
Authorized assignments constituted the permissible value of checks drawn on the
Riksbank. Such checks circulated as means of payment just like bank notes, and, since
their value could exceed the drawer’s deposits and credits with the Riksbank, they
added further to the money supply.
7 Promissary notes issued by companies or
individuals were commonly used, and were widely accepted by the public, as means of
payment. In the 1790's, the issuance of private promissary notes with engraved or
printed denominations was banned.  Until the 1820's, the deposit certificates of discount
companies circulated as bank notes.
8 In addition to various types of IOUs, bonds,
                                                                                                                                          
Finanskommittén 1858 and Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 172-185. Brisman listed the Enskilda banks’
holdings of legal tender for the years 1834-1856, but he did not provide the source (although it probably
was the Financial Committee of 1858). Jonung relied on Brisman’s data for the years it was available. For
the years 1857-1870, he assumed that Enskilda bank holdings of Riksbank notes remained constant at ten
million SEK (Jonung, L. (1989)).
5 Heckscher, E.F. (1965) pp. 294-296
6 Agardh, J.M. (1865) pp. 78, 146, BaU 1834/35 No8 p. 9, 1879 No8 pp. 2-3, Kock, K. (1931) p. 18,
Nordström, J.J. (1853) p. 90, Rosenberg, C.M. (1878) p. 84, Wennberg, J.O. (1829) p. 7, Ögren, A.
(1995) p. 14. The Riksbank’s right to issue one SEK notes was rescinded in 1878 to pave the way for a
more ”civilized usage of coins” (BaU 1879 No8 p.3).
7 BaU 1850-1851 No 2, p. 18. Formally, authorized assignment could be over issued because the velocity
of circulation could be taken into account. Informally, it was realized that a reduction of assignments in
circulation would severely dampen economic activity. See also Engdahl, T. (2002).
8 Brisman (1924) pp. 47-51, 244, Lindgren, H. (2002), Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 44-45. The ban on
private notes with engraved or printed denominations was renewed in the nineteenth century. During the
period 1810-16, the three existing discount companies circulated promissary notes with a value of up to
35 percent of the Riksbank notes in circulation.6
despite their interest bearing nature, also circulated as a means of payment.
9 Thus,
informal money and credit in the form of notes substitutes were supplied in response to
demand. Their quality (or lack thereof), however, restricted their circulation to a
relatively narrow geographic region or personal network.
Despite the contextual definition of money embedded in orthodox economic theory,
(i.e. money is whatever serves as a means of payment or exchange), economists usually
use a static definition to determine which items are to be included in various measures
of the money supply. Because of the state of the means of payment in circulation, as
well as the circular definition of money, it is important that the various monetary
concepts used in this chapter be strictly defined.
A central measure used in this chapter is the par value money circulating throughout
the Country, that is to say, currency or M1. It consists of the public’s holdings of
Enskilda bank and Riksbank notes. This definition is justified by the finding in this
chapter that Enskilda bank notes were not just a claim on central bank reserves. More
importantly, there were acceptable for bank deposits, starting in 1869, even in the
Riksbank. Thus, when in circulation, these notes were not only commercial bank
liabilities, as were demand deposits, but they also constituted a prerequisite for the
emergence of a deposit based banking system.
10
A second measure used in the thesis is M2. It is defined as consisting of M1 plus the
public’s deposits in the commercial banks. The measure is not original and has to some
extent been used in previous research.
11 Its practical importance, however, is
questionable. Since the offices of commercial banks were both few and seldom open,
bank notes were vastly more convenient for transactions than were deposits. If the
deposits of the Swedish public are to be included, a more appropriate measure also
would include deposits in savings banks, since these banks for the most part functioned
as commercial banks.
12
                                                
9 Post & Inrikes Tidning 7/7-1840. The use of domestic bonds as means of payments payment was
discussed relative to the growing money stock.
10 The measure M1 is today usually defined as monetary liabilities of the central bank, i.e. its demand
deposits, circulating notes and coins, plus the public’s demand deposits in commercial banks.
11 See Jonung, L. (1984) & (1989).
12 See Lilja, K. (2000), Petersson, T. (2000) and Sjölander, A. (2000). Thus Swedish savings banks
differed in that respect from the savings banks in many other countries, for instance UK and US.7
Free Banking Theory
A true free banking system is based on the principal that banking should not be
subjected to any legislation distinct from that which applies to any type of business.
Thus there is no need for restrictions on note issue, barriers to entry or legislation
regulating reserves. Naturally, no State sponsored central bank is required.
13 Other than
these basic principles, however, free banking theory varies among authors.
14
The most common version of free banking is based on the experience of Scotland, at
least as interpreted by Selgin, Smith and White.
15 This model is of a system operating
under a specie standard and with fractional reserves. It is thus quite similar to the
Swedish institutional setting, and it is the version of free banking that is referred to in
this chapter.
16
The theory assumes a banking system operating with fractional reserves under a
specie standard. Such a system is believed to be fully self-adjusting, with the supply of
notes matching the demand. Any bank that over issues notes will lose reserves due to a
public reluctance to hold their notes. The bank’s reputation will suffer and the public
will choose higher quality notes; i.e. those of banks with a higher reserve ratio. Thus,
even in the absence of formal rules, a consensus concerning a sound reserve-to-notes
ratio will emerge over time.
17
In theory banks are assumed to operate with gold reserves, thus linking the theory of
free banking to the monetary approach to the balance of payments as a model of the
workings of the gold standard.
18 Inter regional specie flows will establish monetary
                                                
13 Selgin, G.A. & White, L.H. (1994) pp. 1718-1719
14 The most pedagogical way of viewing the differences is through the basis of note issuance and the
choice of a unit of account. Some advocates of commodity-based money backed up to one hundred
percent, argue that smaller reserves are fraudulent. Yet others, argue that a free banking system can be
provided without the use of commodity money or reserves, other than holdings of financial instruments,
with an unit of account pegged to a basket of commodities. See Dowd, K. (1993) pp. 62-67, Rothbard,
M.N. (1985) pp. 13-14, Sechrest, L.J. (1993) pp. 150-154.
15 Sechrest argues that both Smith and White have overvalued the freedom of the Scottish system. Usury
laws, privileged chartered banks among other things limited the free banking of Scotland (Sechrest, L.J.
(1993), p. 92).
16 Also for Sweden, the Scottish banking system served as an example. The Minister of finance C. D.
Skogman, wrote that the Swedish system had the same ideals as the Scottish system. The reason the
Scottish system was not fully adopted in Sweden, he wryly observed, was the difficulty of transforming
Swedes into Scots (Skogman, C.D. (1846:2) pp. 53-54). See also Agardh, J.M. (1865) pp. 295-322,
Nilsson, G.B. (1981) pp. 30-34, Nordström, J.J. (1853) pp. 193-205.
17 Sechrest, L.J. (1993) p. 14, Selgin, G.A. & White, L.H. (1994) p. 1720, White, L.H. (1985) pp. 119-
121, White, L.H. (1989) pp. 21-22, 27-28, 23-36. Theoretically, the bank has a contractual obligation to
the bearer of the bank note to exchange it on demand.
18 Regarding the MABP, see McCloskey, D.N. & Zecher, R.J. (1984) & McCloskey, D.N. & Zecher, R.J.
(1985).8
equilibrium. Over issuance of bank notes in a given region will result in a geographic
outflow of reserves, an increase in public holdings of specie or both, thus lowering the
banks’ reserve ratio.
19
Such a system could be expected to be problematic for an expanding economy,
causing it to suffer from a shortage of specie and, consequently, of notes. According to
free banking theory, the reserve ratio of the banks could change in response to public
demand. That, however, would be contrary to the requirements of the specie standard. A
conflict would thus arise between maintaining the reserve ratio in order to safe guard
specie convertibility and satisfying the domestic demand for money.
20
Prior to the establishment of the Enskilda banks, this conflict was resolved through
the utilization of note substitutes. These substitutes were totally independent of the
specie standard. The challenge facing the financial system that emerged in connection
with the Country’s economic integration, was replacing these note substitutes with more
reliable, nationally accepted, means of payment, without, however, endangering the
convertibility that was the corner stone of the international monetary regime.
The theory of free banking posits an ideal, fully developed banking system
functioning according to the law of adverse clearing. The holder of bank notes has the
ability to choose notes of higher quality if his or her bank lets the quality of its notes
deteriorate by reducing its level of reserves.
In 1989, Lars Jonung published an influential paper concerning the Enskilda banks:
“The Economics of Private Money: The experience of private bank notes in Sweden,
1831-1902”.  Jonung’s free banking perspective caused him to view the Enskilda banks
as a private alternative to notes issue by the State via the Riksbank. Since the notes
issued by the Enskilda banks displaced the Riksbank notes from circulation, Jonung
concluded that the public preferred the former. The impact of the fixed exchange rate
regime, the scarcity of trustworthy means of payment and the consequences of
Gresham’s Law were not considered by Jonung in his analysis of the struggle for market
shares between the Enskilda banks and the Riksbank.
                                                
19 White, L. H. (1989) pp. 21-22, 27-28, 32-36. It is even argued that the international adjustment
mechanism is not fully operational without a pure free banking system (White, L.H. (1985) pp. 119-121).
20 Swedish 19
th century economic debate fully recognized the difficulty of combining a fixed exchange
rate with a growing demand for money and credit. See for instance Agardh, J.M. (1865) p. 154,
Wennberg, J.O. (1829) p. 7.9
Moreover, as in the case of Scotland, it is maintained that the Swedish experience of
this alleged free banking system was one of inherent stability. Supposedly none of these
banks experienced financial difficulty or came to require State assistance. These
conclusions appear to be based directly on the theory, rather than on historical facts.
Nonetheless, among writers in this field, they have been accepted as representing the
Swedish experience of free banking.
21
The Endogenous Approach to Money
This Swedish case seemed illustrative of an endogenous money creation mechanism.
The basic assumption of such a theory is that money in fact is a debt instrument, that is
a transfer of future purchasing power to the present. When one party is willing to incur
debt, and the other to hold it, the consequence is the creation of money. Thus, money
will be supplied in response to demand. If a third party accepts this debt as payment,
then it has become a circulating means of payment. Institutional features affect the
acceptability of the means payment among larger groups. Thus, the value of a means of
payment, that is its quality, is determined by the ability to transfer it to other parties, not
by the reserves held by the issuer.
22
The domestic volume of informal money and credit was demand driven.
Consequently, there was a close relationship between the quantities of credit and means
of payment. The quality of the latter also varied in accordance with their acceptability
within various regions and to various groups of actors. Since the specie standard limited
the supply of money and credit of the highest quality, money and credit of lower quality
were supplied as substitutes.
The Riksbank and the Issuance of “High Powered Notes”
The principal credit and means of payment problem was to convince consumers that
these could be transferred without risk of loss. One way of doing so was to guarantee
that bank notes could be converted into specie. The Swedish central bank, the Riksbank,
followed the dictates of the currency school; the economy was based on a specie
standard, thus stressing the quantity theory of money and the specie flow mechanism.
23
                                                
21 See Schuler, K. (1992) pp. 31-32, 40, Selgin, G.A. (1988) p. 7. Where Selgin also views absence of
regulations as a parameter in the Swedish case.
22 See Bell, S. (2001) Chick, V. (1992) and Wray, L.R. (1990).
23 BaU 1840/41 No4 p. 27, Ögren, A. (1995) p. 1210
The Riksbank was owned and administered by the Parliament (the Riksdag), not the
Crown, and it had the exclusive right to issue legal tender notes. In addition to splitting
the Parliament into factions, the granting of note issuing rights to the Enskilda banks
became the metaphorical banking question in the struggle between Parliament and
Crown. One of the official arguments against the Enskilda banks was that allowing them
to issue notes would endanger international convertibility into specie. In 1850/51, the
Parliament acted to create a new type of commercial bank without note issuing
privileges, the Filial banks. These were instead dependent on credits from the Riksbank.
It was hoped that they would facilitate the replacement of circulating Enskilda bank
notes with Riksbank notes. When it became apparent that this hope was futile, the
Parliament in 1860/61 withdrew its support for the Filial banks.
24
In 1869, the Riksbank began accepting Enskilda bank notes at par, as long as these
notes could be redeemed for Riksbank notes in a city where the Riksbank maintained an
office.
25  The Banking Law of 1897 granted the Riksbank a note issuing monopoly. The
Enskilda banks were required to cease issuing notes by the end of 1903, and all of their
notes were to be withdrawn from circulation by the end of 1906.
26
It was the fundamental duty of the Riksbank to maintain specie convertibility. At the
same time, however, it was also expected to supply Sweden with an adequate supply of
credit. This dual role of guardian of international convertibility and provider of credit
made the level of Riksbank reserves a matter of the utmost importance.
Riksbank Reserves
According to the banking legislation of 1834, note issuance of the Riksbank was to be
based on a fractional reserve system. Reserves were supposed to cover 40 % of issued
notes, and only specie metals were valid as cover for note issue.
Regulatory changes introduced in 1845 permitted the Riksbank to include foreign
holdings such as deposits in foreign banks and banking firms, and treasury bills among
its reserves and to utilize them as backing for its note issue. The system of fractional
reserves was changed to one of differential reserves, the issue of Riksbank notes being
limited to reserves plus thirty million SEK. This change reduced the Riksbank’s note
                                                
24 Montgomery, A. (1934) p. 7. Regarding the political struggle, see Nilsson, G.B. (1981), (1989), (1994)
and Chapter 2 in Ögren, A. (2003a).
25 Ögren, A. (1995) pp. 12-15
26 Brisman, S. (1931) pp. 193-196, RdSkr 1898 No 6611
issuance flexibility and, since they used Riksbank notes as part of their reserves, that of
the Enskilda banks as well. The new regulations were motivated by a belief that falling
reserves would cause a smaller shrinkage of the note issue with a differential, than with
a fractional, reserve system.
In addition to outstanding notes, the Bank’s reserves were supposed to cover its
demand deposits, all types of written assignments and (until 1872) unutilized funds that
were designated for loans and credits to specific social groups. Including these
categories within the money stock ensured that the Riksbank’s notes would be covered
to an internationally sufficient degree. Starting in 1860, the Bank was permitted to hold
up to ten percent of its reserves in gold. In preparation for adoption of the gold standard,
all restrictions on the gold percentage were dropped in 1869.
27
In 1879, the maximum Riksbank note issue was increased to reserves plus thirty five
million SEK. This change was made at the same time as the Enskilda banks were
prohibited from issuing notes of less than ten SEK.
28 The clear intent was that the
increased Riksbank note issue was to replace the low denomination Enskilda bank
notes.
































































































Source: Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 54-71
                                                
27 Brisman, S. (1931) pp. 75-78, 161-165, Davidsson, D. (1931) pp. 38-39, 44, Sveriges Riksbank (1931)
pp. 54-71
28 PrAK. 1879 Vol IV No 50, PrFK 1879 Vol. III No 35, RdSkr 1879 No 52.12
Throughout the period 1834 – 1913, even though a differential reserve system was
used, the specie reserves of the Riksbank covered approximately forty percent of the
Bank’s note issue. As early as 1845, the Riksbank began to intervene in the currency
market by buying and selling foreign bills of exchange. The principal motivation for
these actions was the shortage, and high import cost, of specie.
29 Consequently it was
the foreign component of the Riksbank’s reserves that fluctuated the most, while its
specie reserves remained relatively stable.
Taking an international perspective, the Riksbank maintained a lower coverage of its
notes than did the principal European countries. Its coverage, however, was similar to
that Finland, another peripheral country.
30 The legal tender status of the Riksbank notes,
making them acceptable for tax payments, as well as their specie backing made them a
form of domestic ”high powered” money. Thus the Riksbank notes also served as
backing for the Enskilda bank notes. Since the Riksbank’s obligation to preserve
international specie convertibility limited its ability to supply credit and means of
payment, this task was instead undertaken by the Enskilda banks.
Enskilda Banks and the Issuance of “Medium Powered Notes”
Two distinct features characterized the Enskilda banks: the right to issue notes and the
unlimited liability of their share holders. The first Enskilda banks had been established
in the early 1830's, but their numbers grew only slowly until after 1865, to a large extent
as the result of restrictions on their establishment. Entry into banking was far from
free.
31 Their formal, legal acceptance as a distinct banking system came only with the
Bank Law of 1864.  Most importantly, this Law assured that all new bank charters that
met standard criteria would be approved and that the renewal of existing bank charters
would be virtually automatic. Still, the limits on note denominations and the taxes on
note issuance that were imposed by the Parliament prevented the creation of a ”full
fledged” free banking system.
32
                                                
29 BaU 1868 No2 pp. 2-3, Lobell, H. (1999) pp. 89-92
30 Flandreau, M. (2000), Pipping, H.E. (1961) pp. 509, 512, Pipping, H.E. (1969) p. 432, Sveriges
Riksbank (1931) pp. 45-49
31 Kock, K. (1931) pp. 103-104. The Crown twice, in 1841 and in 1849, rejected Skåne Enskilda Bank’s
request for an extension of the redemption time limit on its notes, in view of its pending charter renewal
application.
32 SFS 1864:31 §§1, 26. The Parliamentary opposition to the Enskilda banks did not stand idly by as the
notes of these banks in circulation rapidly expanded. In 1861, a tax of 0.2 percent, later increased to 0.313












































































Sources: Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1871, Sammandrag af bankernas uppgifter 1871-1900, Sveriges
Riksbank (1931) pp. 172-179.
The first Royal proclamation concerning the right to engage in banking had been
issued in 1824, but the first Enskilda bank (Skåne Enskilda Bank) was not established
until 1831. A puzzling question is why seven years elapsed between the proclamation
and the first application for a charter.
33 The answer, quite simply, is that re-
establishment of the specie standard was a prerequisite for the opening of private banks.
The definitive Parliamentary decision to re-adopt the silver standard, thus setting the
base value of the currency in terms of that metal, as well as to when notes would
become exchangeable for silver coins, was taken in March of 1830. The first application
for a bank charter then followed six months later in September of 1830.
34
The establishment of the silver standard was essential for the establishment of a note
issuing banking system during the nineteenth century. It provided the public confidence
that was absolutely vital, at lest until the Enskilda banks had become firmly established.
Thus, the notes issued by the Enskilda banks would not have achieved nearly the same
level of acceptance had they not been backed by legal tender. Had the Riksbank notes
not been secured by a fixed quantity of specie, the Enskilda banks would have had to
                                                                                                                                          
percent in 1887, 0.5 percent in 1892 and finally to 1.0 percent in 1893, was imposed on the issuance of
such notes (RdSkr 1887 No49, 1892 No98, 1893 No45, SFS 1861:34 §15).
33 According to Jonung, the explanation lay in a combination of the usury law’s limitation on bank loan
interest rates and the existence of an unrestricted, non-bank capital market. Given this situation, the banks
found it difficult to compete effectively for funds (Jonung, L (1989) p. 7).
34 Kock, K (1931) pp. 45-50. The fundamental importance of the specie standard for the ability to
establish banks, was conveyed to Parliament by the founders of Skåne Enskilda Bank. See also
Bankkomitén (1883) p. 138, Nordström, J.J. (1853) p. 245, Rosenberg, C.M. (1878) p. 81, Wennberg,
J.O. (1829) p. 31.14
operate with specie reserves. The Swedish supply of specie, however, was insufficient
to allow the Enskilda banks to operate directly with specie.
The Royal proclamation of 1824 did not mention the right to issue notes, nor was any
such right mentioned in Skåne Enskilda Bank’s first charter, it was, however, permitted
to issue printed, non-interest bearing certificates of deposit payable on demand. These
could be transferred from person to person in denominations below 20 Rdr. Banco. In
practice, these CDs were identical to bank notes.
35 Starting with the third Enskilda bank,
established in 1836, requirements for bank note issuance were written into the charters.
In 1846, uniform such requirements were enacted into law.
A fundamental aspect of free banking is the evolution of an inter-bank clearing
mechanism. The safer system associated with the Enskilda banks, as well as their
practice of accepting each other’s notes, can be dated back at least to the legislation of
1846.
36 Still, no regular clearing institution emerged until the establishment of
Stockholm Enskilda Bank in 1856. Previously existing Enskilda banks outside the
Capital had recognized the importance of having a single clearing institution. Instead
this function had been performed by a number of financial actors in Stockholm.
37
Two features closely associated with the Enskilda banks during the gold standard
period were already contained in the 1864 legislation. First, their notes were to be
exchangeable for Riksbank notes or specie at their main office and, second, while they
were given the option of delaying such an exchange for six months, such action would
result in an interest penalty of six percent per annum. These rules were probably aimed
at increasing the stability of the Enskilda bank system, thus decreasing the probability of
bank runs.
38
                                                
35 Skogman, the Crown’s representative, did not concede that either Skåne Enskilda Bank, or the second
such bank, Wermland Enskilda Bank, had any right to issue notes. This despite the fact that Wermland
Enskilda bank in its charter, as well as its balance sheets, used the term ”notes” (Skogman,C.D. (1846:1)
pp. 181-182, 196-199, Post & Inrikes Tidning 29/4-1835). Both Brisman and Jonung describe the note
issuing right as unintended (Brisman, S. (1924) pp. 90-92, Jonung, L. (1989) p. 14). Given the open and
positive attitude on private bank note issuance in the Parliament, Skogman must have known that this was
the only possible use for these ”certificates of deposit” (See Ögren, A. (2003a) Chapter 2, see also
Nilsson, G.B. (1981) pp. 26, 399 note 17).
36 Kock, K. (1931) pp. 80, 93-103, Rosenberg, C.M. (1878) pp. 83-84, SFS 1846:1 §11, Skogman, C.D.
(1846:1) pp. 196-199
37 Nilsson, G.B. (1989) pp. 107-110, Söderlund, E. (1964) pp. 115-119. Starting in the 1870's,
Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolaget, a joint stock bank, assumed clearing responsibilities for the Enskilda
banks.
38 SFS 1864:31 §§27-28, Thus, these features were not implemented just to protect the gold holdings of
the Enskild banks, but to protect their reserves generally. See Flux, A.W. (1910) pp. 61-63, Jonung, L.
(1984) pp. 371-372. The option clause has been presented as an example of how to create stability in a15
Enskilda Bank Reserves
According to the Law of 1846, as well as pre-existing bank charters, the principal basis
for their note issuance was the Enskilda bank’s equity capital. Entered on the asset side
of the bank’s balance sheet, this equity capital was divided into two parts. Between sixty
and seventy five percent consisted of bonds and shares. These were either deposited in a
municipal office or were kept in the bank’s safe. The rest was legal tender cash. The
bank’s note issue had to be fully backed by the sum of: 1) the securities held as part of
the bank’s equity capital, 2) the legal tender held by the bank, either at its exchange
office or with the Riksbank, 3) the silver held by the bank and 4) collateral for the
bank’s loan up to an amount not to exceed fifty percent of the bank’s equity capital.
39
Accompanying the switch from the silver to the gold standard, new bank legislation
was enacted in 1874. According to the new rules, the bank’s note issue had to be fully
backed by the sum of: 1) the securities portion of the bank’s equity capital, 2) the
reserve fund of the bank, 3) the claims of the bank, not to exceed fifty percent of the
bank’s equity and on the condition that the bank’s main office held gold coin equal to at
least ten percent of the bank’s equity and 4) any gold holdings in excess of ten percent
of the equity capital.
In practice, these rules did not constrain the note issuance of the Enskilda banks.
Indeed, they continually failed to reach their allowable note issue limits.
                                                                                                                                          
free banking system. Dowd, K. (1993) pp. 31-33, Gherity, J.A. (1995) pp. 722-724, Selgin, G.A. &
White, L.H. (1997) pp. 270-272. Despite explicit statements, both in the Law and the bank charters, that
the bank’s were not entitled to any public support, such support was in fact provided in several critical
situations (Brisman, S. (1934) pp. 102-103, 105-106, Schön, L. (2000) p. 165, Ögren, A. (2000) pp. 103-
104, Ögren, A. (2003b).
39 SFS 1846:1 §§8, 11, Skogman, C.D. (1846:2) pp. 38-42, 50-54. In its early days, a bank could count
the owners’ personal promissary notes as part of its equity capital (Post & Inrikes Tidning 2/2, 9/5-1843).
The two earliest banks counted their own notes as equity during 1834-39, and until 1846 all the banks
counted the notes of other Enskilda banks (Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1847, especially 21/3, 29/4-1835,
9/3, 26/4-1836).16
Figure 3: Unutilized Note Issuing Rights of Enskilda banks, 1834 – 1900 (in















































































Sources: Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter 1871-1900
Instead, what effectively limited their note issuance were the liquid reserves they had
available for redeeming their notes for legal tender. Even prior to the 1874 legislation,
the banks were free to exchange their notes either for coins or for Riksbank notes. At no
point did the law, or the bank charters, prevent the banks from limiting their reserves to
specie, thus making them independent of the Riksbank. Even after 1874, the Enskilda
banks continued principally to hold Riksbank notes as reserves. They did so despite the
fact that the Riksbank itself had started accepting Enskilda bank notes in 1869.
According to the Banking Law 1874, the formal backing of the Enskilda banks’
notes did not include any holdings of Riksbank notes.
40 Despite the fact that Riksbank
notes legally were as useless for note coverage as were Enskilda bank notes, the
Enskilda banks continued to hold large amounts of Riksbank notes, but only negligible
amounts of notes issued by other Enskilda banks. Competition was one reason for not
holding the notes of other Enskilda banks, but why favor the Riksbank by holding large
quantities of its notes? The answer was that the public literally considered the Riksbank
notes to be as good as gold. As a result, the effective reserves of the Enskilda banks
consisted of Riksbank notes and, to a lesser extent, of specie. In figure 4 below, these
effective reserves have been computed as the Enskilda banks’ holdings of specie and
Riksbank notes, plus their Riksbank notes deposited with exchange agents or in the
Riksbank.
                                                
40 SFS 1874:44 §§26-28. The legislation that required the redemption of notes with gold coins can be seen
as limiting the legal tender status of Riksbank notes. Indeed, it was suggested that the constitutional
clause conferring such status should be revoked (Flux, A.W. (1910) p. 63, Nilsson, G.B. (1994) p. 101).17

















































































EB notes backing in % with Rb notes
EB notes backing in gold
Total backing of EB notes
Sources: Brisman (1924) pp. 246-247, Post & Inrikes Tidning, 1835-1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas
Uppgifter, 1871-1900.
After 1874, the Enskilda banks held gold equal to between eleven and nineteen
percent of their note issue. If Riksbank notes are also counted, their notes were
approximately thirty to thirty five percent backed. With the single exception of
Stockholm Enskilda Bank, they all held gold equal to between ten and fourteen percent
of their total equity capital. Stockholm Enskilda Bank held gold equal to between
twenty eight and thirty percent of its equity capital. This made the Bank more attractive
to the foreign lenders on whom it depended for many of its operations. Consequently,
those banks that wished to attract foreign credits were especially dependent on specie
reserves.
Despite this rather low gold backing, the Enskilda banks never came close to their
legal note issuing limits. The sources concerning the post 1874 issuance of Enskilda
bank notes make it clear that their holdings of Riksbank notes continued to be a matter
of importance. Indeed, the ratio of Enskilda bank holdings of Riksbank notes, coins and
gold bullion to their note issue was published throughout the period.
41 The 1874
legislation effectively forced the Enskilda banks to hold gold since having ten percent of
their equity capital in gold entitled them to issue notes equal to a full fifty percent of
                                                
41 Sammandrag af Bankernas uppgifter 1875-1906, SFS 1874:44 §26.18
that equity capital.
42 Regression analysis, however, indicates that they continued to base
their note issuance on Riksbank notes, even after implementation of the 1874
legislation.




Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.376193 0.089828 -4.187937 0.0004
LOG(EBRBNOTES) 0.122716 0.041610 2.949195 0.0072
EBSPECIE 4.543155 1.454567 3.123372 0.0048
LOG(EBNOTES(-1)) 0.649499 0.069424 9.355526 0.0000
R-squared 0.958363     Mean dependent var -2.009537
Adjusted R-squared 0.952932     S.D. dependent var 0.191921
Log likelihood 49.67964     F-statistic 176.4656
Durbin-Watson stat 1.998017     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
* Significant at least at the 5% level
Source: Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter, 1871-1900.
The Enskilda banks were not willing to exchange Riksbank notes for gold. This
policy has two implications: 1) holding Riksbank notes as reserves provided the banks
with more business opportunities than did specie reserves and 2) the Swedish public
was prepared to accept Riksbank notes in exchange for Enskilda bank notes. The
generally declining level of reserves can be explained by growing confidence in the
banking system, making the public willing to accept a lower level of reserves, together
with an increasing demand for credit.
It can be argued that the Enskilda banks maintained the level of reserves demanded
by their customers. The level of demand for means of payment and credit prevented the
Enskilda banks from operating exclusively with specie reserves. Arguably, since the
reserves were essential for maintaining the status or quality of the Enskilda bank notes,
the public also had an interest in maintaining the ”medium powered” characteristic of
the notes. This did not require that their issuance be limited to the same extent as
required to make them ”high powered”, i.e. sufficiently backed by specie. Thus, more
                                                
42 The Enskilda banks waited for the adoption of the gold standard in 1873 before starting to purchase
large quantities of gold, increasing their holdings from virtually zero to nearly nine million SEK in only
two years (Jonung, L. (1984) p. 372). When their right to issue notes was withdrawn, the Enskilda banks
reduced their gold holdings from 9.5 million SEK in 1900 to little more than one quarter million in 1903
(Sammandrag af Bankernas uppgifter 1875-1906).19
“medium powered” notes could be supplied. By extension, the use of Riksbank notes as
Enskilda bank reserves created a claim on the Riksbank’s reserves. Thus the Enskilda
banks benefited from the trust in the currency that had been created by the Riksbank’s
dedication to maintaining specie convertibility.
From the inception of the system, the Enskilda banks had had the opportunity to
practice free banking based exclusively on specie reserves. So doing would have made
them independent of the Riksbank, and thus capable of competing with the Riksbank
notes. Indeed, that is how the experience of the Enskilda banks is described in the free
banking literature. In fact, however, even after they were legally required to hold specie
rather than Riksbank note, reserves, the Enskilda banks clearly preferred the Riksbank
notes. The public, and therefore the banks, preferred more ”medium powered” than
fewer ”high powered” notes. Thus it can be concluded that, under the circumstances, the
actual specie exchange system was more efficient than a hypothetical free banking
system.
The Circulation of Currency
The circulation of currency within Sweden during the period 1834 to 1900 depended
largely on the note issuance of the Enskilda banks. The Riksbank notes, in turn,
provided the base for the total amount of circulating notes. Deducting the Riksbank
notes held by Enskilda banks at their exchange offices or on deposit at the Riksbank
from the total issue of such notes, ought to provide an accurate estimate of the public’s
holdings of Riksbank notes.20














































































Enskilda Bank notes held by the public.
RB notes held by the public
Total notes in circulation (M1)
EBs holdings of RB notes
Sources: Brisman (1924) pp. 246-247, Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas
Uppgifter 1871-1900, Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 45-49
Starting in the 1860's, Enskilda bank notes became the principal form of circulating
means of payment, surpassing the Riksbank notes. Indeed, as early as 1859, the
circulation of Enskilda bank notes exceeded that of Riksbank notes. That is, twelve
Enskilda banks, three of which were only recently established, jointly managed to out
circulate the Riksbank. The five year period 1869-1874 witnessed an economic boom in
Sweden. Partly as a consequence, note issuing activity increased resulting, in turn, in a
growing demand by the Enskilda banks for Riksbank notes as backing. The amount of
Riksbank notes held by the Enskilda banks grew to exceed the amount in circulation.
The weaker relationship between Enskilda bank holdings of Riksbank notes and their
own note issue, starting in the 1880's, implies both a greater demand for credit and a
growing level of public confidence in the banking system. A result of this was an
increase in the quantity of Riksbank notes available for circulation.
Enskilda bank note issuing activity reached a peak in 1900 and then declined. The
Banking Law of 1897 banned further issue of Enskilda bank notes after 1903 and
required their withdrawal from circulation by the end of 1906. The data in Figure 6 ends
in 1900 because of the rapid increase in Riksbank notes at the beginning of the 1900's,
and the breaking of the relationship between Riksbank and Enskilda bank notes. This
expansion was not just the result of the withdrawal of Enskilda bank notes since total
note circulation increased by one hundred fifty percent between 1900 and 1913.21
There is an important distinction between the banks’ ability to issue notes and their
ability to keep them in circulation.
43 Keeping notes in circulation depended on three
factors: 1) the geographical distance between the point of issue and the areas of
circulation, 2) the denomination of the notes (smaller denominations tended to circulate
longer) and 3) alternative available means of payment.
Throughout the period, the Riksbank was authorized to issue smaller denominations
than were the Enskilda banks. This increased the incentive of the latter to spread their
notes throughout the Country. In order to accomplish this, the banks opened branch
offices or engaged other financial actors as exchange agents. These were usually
merchants, private banking firms or savings banks. During their short history, the Filial
banks also functioned as distributors of Enskilda bank notes. An often asserted strategy
of the Enskilda banks was to get their notes into circulation in isolated areas, thus
reducing the chance of quick redemption for legal tender.
44
In connection with the establishment of an inter bank clearing system, Stockholm
Enskilda Bank invented the so-called ”postal bank bill” (postremissväxel) to substitute
for the mailing of bank notes. Instead of mailing bank notes, a postal bank bill was
purchased at the nearest bank and sent by ordinary mail. The recipient could then cash
the bill at any conveniently located bank. Payable on demand, and not being subject to
any discount, the postal bank bill functioned as a lubricant in the clearing machinery.
Instead of locking up bank notes in postal bags, and thus removing them from
circulation for several days, these written payment orders were utilized. By cashing
these postal bank bills, a bank had an opportunity to place its own notes on the market.
45
The Enskilda banks were willing to bear some discount costs in order to make their
notes closer substitutes for Riksbank notes. In order to assure holders of the
convertibility of Enskilda bank notes into legal tender, the exchange agents were
compensated in positive relation to the quantity of the bank’s notes that they exchanged
for legal tender.
46 Furthermore, in at least some parts of the Country, the Enskilda banks
paid a small fee to the municipal tax authorities to act as exchange agents in connection
                                                
43 Dowd, K (1993) p. 29, White, L.H. (1989) p. 21
44 Brisman, S. (1934) pp. 23-25, Petersson, T. (1999) p. 64 Note 136
45 Nilsson, G.B. (1989) pp. 113-119. Trust in the postal bank bills as a way of transferring payments is
unquestioned. They were even accepted in the countries neighboring Sweden (Flux, A.W. (1910) p. 56).
46 Engdahl, T. (2002)22
with tax payments.
47 Thus, despite their non-legal tender status, these notes could be
used to pay taxes.
In view of the large circulation of Enskilda bank notes starting in the 1860's, it seems
likely that they succeeded in becoming acceptable nation wide. Previously, in 1855,
legislation had standardized the size of Enskilda bank notes of a given denomination.
48
Judging by the large quantity of Enskilda bank notes in circulation by 1869, it seems
probable that the Riksbank had been forced to accept them as the Riksbank had been
forced to accept them as the principal circulation means of payment.
49
The achievements of the Enskilda banks were not limited to successfully competing
with State issued notes on a fully monetized market. Deliberately or not, the Enskilda
bank notes came to replace the widely used local, non-specie connected, substitute
means of payment.
50
It is possible to derive a quality grid among various means of payments with the
same face value. The Enskilda banks had an advantage in not being subordinated to the
specie standard and therefore not having to cover their critical liabilities, such as
demand deposits and bank-post bills, to nearly the same extent as the Riksbank. Since
the latter’s ultimate responsibility for preserving the specie standard prevented it from
holding insufficient reserves, its notes were of a higher quality than the Enskilda bank
notes.
51 These banks could then use the Riksbank notes as a base for issuing their own
notes, and, as a consequence, they tended to hoard Riksbank notes.
For the ordinary Swede, however, the Enskilda bank notes were a close substitute for
Riksbank notes. While not as well backed as the latter, the Enskilda bank notes were of
much better quality than other circulating instruments. The Enskilda bank notes were
not only related to the specie standard, being backed by Riksbank notes, but they were
                                                
47 Nilsson, G.B. (1989) pp. 135-136, SmålB 1840, 1845. In 1841, a Parliamentary bill proposing the
acceptance of Enskilda bank notes for tax payments, was defeated (StU 1840/41 No 143, 209).
48 Rosenberg, C.M. (1878) p. 85
49 A bill requiring the Riksbank to accept Enskilda bank notes was rejected during the 1865/66 session
(BaU 1865/66 No18). In 1869, the chairman of the Standing Committee on Banking was still opposed
(BaU 1869 No6 p. 3).
50 An example of this development concerns the right to over issue authorized assignments. In 1834, the
Riksbank raised this as a problem, but opposed any corrective measures since their effect would be to
harm the rural economy. The abolition of such rights in 1851 was justified by the claim that there no
longer was any rural shortage of small denominations (Bankkomitén (1883) pp. 149-151, BaU 1850/51
No2 p. 18). In fact, however, public confidence in authorized assignments had been undermined by a
number of frauds that occurred during the crisis of 1847/48. Enskilda bank notes were considered more
trustworthy (see Engdahl, T. (2002)).
51 Ögren, A. (2000) p. 4923
also guaranteed by the bank’s equity capital and the unlimited liability of the owners.
These were confidence inducing features that other substitutes lacked.
From this analysis it can be concluded that the Enskilda bank notes did not displace
Riksbank notes because they were preferred by the public. The Swedish need for credit
and means of payments institutionalized two types of notes, exchangeable at par. The
Riksbank notes were legal tender and cold be used as a base for issuing Enskilda bank
notes. These notes, in turn, could be used for virtually all domestic transactions, as well
as be used for bank deposits.
Expanding the Money Supply
There are two important aspects to the domestic creation of money. The first is the
amount of circulating currency that can be used for deposits, and the second is the
sophistication of the financial system in terms of being able to create credit through
deposits. The amount of currency, or M1, consisted of Riksbank and Enskilda bank
notes held by the public. The level of development of the banking system then
determined the amounts of M2 (M1 plus commercial bank deposits) and M3 (M2 plus
savings bank deposits) that could be based on a given level of M1.
The Total Backing of Currency
If the commitment to the specie standard is viewed as a commitment to an international
monetary regime, then it becomes useful to compare the Swedish ratio of total specie
reserves to total note circulation with that in other countries. During the period 1880 to
1900, this ratio was lower in Sweden than in the core European countries. The Riksbank
also maintained a somewhat lower backing for its notes than did the central banks of
England, France and Germany.
52 The peripheral status of the Swedish economy
probably allowed the Country to maintain lower reserves than was the case for the
major European economies. Another peripheral economy, Finland, covered its central
bank note issue to approximately the same degree as did the Riksbank.
If circulating Enskilda bank notes and their specie backing is included in reserves,
then up until the late 1890's, with the single exception of 1874, the backing of notes in
circulation was less in Sweden than in Finland. This implies that Sweden’s peripheral
position is not the entire explanation for the relatively low note coverage.
                                                
52 Flandreau, M. (2000) Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 45-49, 54-7124
Figure 7: Specie Coverage of Notes Circulating in Sweden (1834 – 1900) and Finland
















































































RB specie cover of issued notes
Total specie cover of Swedish currency in circulation
Bank of Finland specie cover of issued notes
Sources: Brisman (1924) pp. 246-247, Pipping, E.H. (1961) pp. 509, 512, Pipping, E.H. (1969) p. 432,
Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter 1871-1900, Sveriges Riksbank
(1931) pp. 45-49, 54-71
The cessation of note issuance by the Enskilda banks early in the twentieth century
did not lead to any major increase in total Swedish reserves. The Riksbank’s backing of
its own notes decreased drastically, suggesting that such notes replaced the previously
circulating Enskilda bank notes. It can be argued that the requirements of the specie
standard previously would have prevented such a development.
The rather special Swedish system, combining the Riksbank as an issuer of high
powered notes and with the ultimate responsibility for preserving international specie
convertibility with the private Enskilda banks as note issuers, allowed a greater
expansion of the money supply (M1) than otherwise would have been the case.
Furthermore, the choice of the Enskilda banks (tolerated by the public) to rely more on
Riksbank notes than on specie for their reserves led to a greater expansion of the total
money supply than otherwise would have been possible.
Instead of allowing the Enskilda banks to pump up the domestic money supply, the
Riksbank could have borrowed on the international money market in order to purchase
specie, as it did during the crisis of 1857, to be used as backing for a greater note issue.
Not only would such a course of action have been costly, however, it was believed that25
it would damage the reputation of the Swedish currency. Consequently, Parliament
refused permission for such a course of action.
 53
Swedish Monetization
Although Enskilda bank notes were not regarded as legal tender during this period, they
were accepted by other Enskilda banks at least as early as 1846 and probably earlier.
54
The savings banks had begun accepting deposits of Enskilda bank notes early in their
history and the Riksbank followed suit in 1869.
55 This made the Enskilda bank notes as
effective in expanding the money supply through deposits as were the Riksbank notes.








































































RB & EB notes in circulation
(M1)
(M1)+ Public deposits in
commercial banks (M2)
(M2) + Public deposits in Savings
banks (M3)
Sources: Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter 1871-1900, SCB
(1960) pp. 99, 102-103 Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 45-49, 172-179
Figure 8 shows that, starting in the 1870's, the money stock inclusive of commercial
bank deposits (M2) and also savings bank deposits (M3) started to grow rapidly, with a
second ”take off” occurring in 1895. By 1867, Enskilda bank deposits exceeded the
value of Enskilda bank notes in circulation.
56 From that year forward, the principal
source of bank business financing was deposits.
                                                
53 Ögren, A. (2000) p. 95
54 Rosenberg, C.M. (1878) pp. 83-84
55 Lilja, K. (2000) p. 53 note 168, Petersson, T. (2000) p. 24 note 2, Sjölander, A. (2000) p. 4. Aside from
their active participation in local credit markets, the savings banks were also entangled with the area’s
commercial banks. They had over lapping boards, savings bank deposits were made available to the
commercial banks and the savings banks functioned as distributors of Enskilda bank notes.
56 Sveriges Riksbank (1931) p. 17726
The remarkable growth of the Swedish money supply is well illustrated by the fact
between 1834 and 1913, M3 per capita increased nearly forty times. To a considerable
degree, this was a result of the low starting point for credit money (it increased from
thirteen SEK per capita in 1834 to over five hundred SEK in 1913). Obviously, not all
components of the money supply grew that rapidly. The money stock in terms of
circulating notes (M1) increased three and one half times over during the period. The
difference between the extremely rapid growth of M2 and M3 compared to M1
definitely underscores the crucial role played by the banking system in the process of
expanding the money supply during these eight decades of profound economic
transformation.
Before deposits could become a major source of resources for the banks, a means of
payment more official than note substitutes had to circulate as money. In all probability,
the creation and issuance of ”medium powered” notes was a prerequisite for the creation
of a deposit financed banking system, and thus for the monetization of Sweden. A
measure of monetization utilized by Fisher and Thurman is the velocity of circulation of
means of payments.  A decrease of this velocity implies increased monetization.
57












































































Sources: Krantz, O. (1997) pp. 20-22, Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas
Uppgifter, 1871-1900, SCB (1960) pp. 99, 102-103, Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 45-50, 172-185.
                                                
57 Fisher, D. & Thurman, W.N. (1989) pp. 629-631. Velocity is calculated from the quantity theory
equation; V = P*Y/M. All the series are in index form with 1870=100.27
Decreased velocity is associated with increased monetization, as it is assumed to
result from the substitution of formal for informal means of payments. In terms of
monetization, a major acceleration appears to have occurred in the late 1860's,
coinciding, not surprisingly, with the rapid establishment of new banks and an increased
emphasis on financing banking activity with deposits. In overall economic terms, the
1860's were not a prosperous decade in Sweden. Nonetheless, the foundations for the
economic growth experienced during the latter part of the nineteenth century were laid
during these years. The increased monetization that occurred may also explain the
relative stability of velocity under the gold standard.
Conclusions
The Swedish experience with private note issuance was more than a competition
between the Enskilda banks and the Riksbank. To a great degree, the success of the
Enskilda bank notes depended on the Riksbank acting to effectively maintain their
convertibility into specie. Between 1834 and 1900, it was possible to combine
international specie convertibility with the monetary needs of a growing economy. The
supply of money expanded at a rate that would not have been possible without the
special features of the Swedish financial system.
At least after 1859, Enskilda bank notes became dominant in circulation. At the same
time, these notes replaced other means of payment that were independent of the specie
standard. Thus, as the principal, nationally accepted, means of payment, the Enskilda
bank notes played a major role in the economic integration of Sweden. Such integration
would have been impossible without a means of payment having nation wide
acceptability, a quality most of the note substitutes lacked.
In addition to the ”high powered” Riksbank notes backed by specie, large amounts of
”medium powered” Enskilda bank notes, backed by Riksbank notes, were in circulation.
Since these were exchangeable at par and were accepted nationwide, they are
considered to be currency (M1) and are evaluated in relation to the total specie reserves
of Riksbank and the Enskilda banks. Compared to Finland, another peripheral country
but with a different monetary system, Sweden enjoyed a higher currency in circulation
to specie holdings ratio. The Riksbank alone would not have been able to circulate such
a large quantity of currency without increasing its reserves, and thus its costs.28
Moreover, the Riksbank and the Enskilda banks together circulated enough currency
(M1) to lay the basis for a deposit financed banking system. Thus, Swedish
monetization in terms of a circulating money supply accepted nationwide mainly
occurred during the late 1860's.
This experience, combining the issuance of “high powered” money in accord with
international reserve standards with the circulation of lower quality monetary
alternatives, points in the direction of an endogenous money system. Throughout the
period, money and credit were closely linked to, and followed, movements in the level
of demand. If the restrictions of the specie standard constrained the supply of high
powered money, then credit and lower quality means of payment were supplied instead.
The principal improvement in monetary quality resulted from the replacement of note
substitutes with Enskilda bank notes, which also could serve as deposits. To make their
notes exchangeable with Riksbank notes at par, the Enskilda banks had to bear part of
the discount costs.
The system of Enskilda banks resembled a theoretical free banking system in that
their issuance of notes resulted in the emergence of clearing activities and offices.
Furthermore, it was the requirements of the public, not any legal regulations, that
effectively limited the note issue. After 1864, a relatively liberal attitude towards the
establishment of banks prevailed. Nonetheless, there were special banking laws,
including rules limiting the issuance of notes. The most important argument for
rejecting the free banking label, however, is that not only was there a central bank but
the Enskilda banks voluntarily choose to back their notes with Riksbank notes. The fact
that more Enskilda than Riksbank notes circulated among the public was a result of the
law of adverse monetary selection: Gresham’s Law.
Nothing prevented the Enskilda banks from accumulating specie reserves.
Throughout the period, however, they preferred to hold their reserves in the form of
Riksbank notes. Even after the legislation of 1874 formally made the Enskilda bank
notes redeemable only for domestic gold coins, they continued to base their note
issuance on Riksbank notes. Most of the Enskilda banks held gold only as a response to
the requirements of the 1874 law. For most domestic note holders, Riksbank notes were
a close and acceptable alternative to gold reserves. Thus, allowing the Enskilda banks to
issue their own notes, backed by Riksbank notes, was not only preferred by the public.
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Appendix  – The Note Issuance Determination Model




Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.376193 0.089828 -4.187937 0.0004
LOG(EBRBNOTES) 0.122716 0.041610 2.949195 0.0072
EBSPECIE 4.543155 1.454567 3.123372 0.0048
LOG(EBNOTES(-1)) 0.649499 0.069424 9.355526 0.0000
R-squared 0.958363     Mean dependent var -2.009537
Adjusted R-squared 0.952932     S.D. dependent var 0.191921
S.E. of regression 0.041638     Akaike info criterion -3.383677
Sum squared resid 0.039875     Schwarz criterion -3.191701
Log likelihood 49.67964     F-statistic 176.4656
Durbin-Watson stat 1.998017     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
The dependent variable is Enskilda bank notes in circulation (EBNOTES), the
independent variables are the Enskilda banks’ total holdings of Riksbank notes
(EBRBNOTES), specie (EBSPECIE), and issued Enskilda bank notes lagged one year
(EBNOTES(-1)). The model includes the lagged value of issued Enskilda bank notes
since it is reasonable to assume a certain stickiness in the issuance of notes, i.e. the
amount of notes in circulation the previous year affects the amount of notes current
year.
The series are set in relation to total assets/liabilities of all banks. A problem is the
series of the Enskilda banks holdings of specie (EBSPECIE), since this series as
logarithmic is not significantly stationary. The original series is stationary and has been
used in the model.35
Appendix Figure 2: ADF test of unit roots up to five lags, most significant values.
ADF Test Statistic for series
LOG(EBNOTES)
-3.619380     1%   Critical Value* -3.6959
    5%   Critical Value -2.9750
    10% Critical Value -2.6265
ADF Test Statistic for series
LOG(EBRBNOTES)
-4.640437     1%   Critical Value* -3.6959
    5%   Critical Value -2.9750
    10% Critical Value -2.6265
ADF Test Statistic for series EBSPECIE -3.339449     1%   Critical Value* -3.6959
    5%   Critical Value -2.9750
    10% Critical Value -2.6265
ADF Test Statistic for series
LOG(EBSPECIE)
-0.520820     1%   Critical Value* -3.8067
    5%   Critical Value -3.0199
    10% Critical Value -2.6502
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
The residual is normally distributed, the model does not suffer from serial correlation
or heteroscedasticity, and is stable according to the Ramsey RESET test.


































Mean     -3.68E-16
Median -0.006995
Maximum   0.081251
Minimum -0.063485
Std. Dev.    0.039162
Skewness    0.524510
Kurtosis    2.502613
Jarque-Bera  1.516315
Probability  0.46852936
Appendix Figure 4: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test, White
Heteroskedasticity Test (including cross-terms), Ramsey RESET Test (general stability
and specification test)
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
F-statistic 0.000119     Probability 0.991382
Obs*R-squared 0.000146     Probability 0.990343
White Heteroskedasticity Test (cross terms):
F-statistic 1.241716     Probability 0.334270
Obs*R-squared 10.70922     Probability 0.296168
Ramsey RESET Test:
F-statistic 0.008583     Probability 0.927023
Log likelihood ratio 0.010532     Probability 0.918260
One problem is multicolinearity, as seen in Appendix Figure 5 below there is a high
degree of correlation between the lagged value of issued Enskilda bank notes and the
Enskilda banks’ holdings of Riksbank notes.
Appendix Figure 5:Testing for multicolinearity (Correlations between independent
variables)
LOG(EBNOTES(-1)) LOG(EBRBNOTES) EBSPECIE
LOG(EBNOTES(-1))  1.000000  0.772762  0.300077
LOG(EBRBNOTES)  0.772762  1.000000 -0.055942
EBSPECIE  0.300077 -0.055942  1.000000
However, running the model without the lagged value of issued Enskilda bank notes
does not make the holdings of Riksbank notes insignificant in determine the issuance of
Enskilda bank notes. Consequently this multicolinearity does not corrupt the observed
importance of Riksbank notes functioning as basis for issuance of Enskilda bank notes
(although, the size of the impact of Riksbank note holdings seems to be higher than
shown in figure 5).
Appendix Figure 6: Regression to test if Multicolinearity corrupts the results
Dependent Variable: LOG(EBNOTES)
Sample: 1874 1900
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.648080 0.182402 -3.553038 0.0016
LOG(EBRBNOTES) 0.445430 0.049939 8.919473 0.0000
EBSPECIE 11.91539 2.623730 4.541391 0.0001